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Doctor fink paterson free#

Fink had sustained a heart attack in August 1953 and a cerebral embolism April 7, 1954.

Respondent's appeal poses two points: (1) the factual conclusions as to emotional strain were not proven (2) defects in the hypothetical questions addressed to two of petitioner's medical experts nullify their testimony. The immediate cause of death was a heart attack found to have been precipitated by an employment incident attended with considerable apprehension and tension on the part of the decedent. Fink, petitioner's deceased husband, died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as manager of respondent's housing project. The Passaic County Court concurred with the Division of Workmen's Compensation in concluding that Samuel R.The immediacy of the attack in relation to the episode of stress is most persuasive.

Doctor fink paterson free#

If it was his medical view that the facts in proof did not show an emotional episode of such degree as to have the probable capacity of producing in such a person as petitioner the fatal attack, the tribunals below were free to find to the contrary from the testimony of the petitioner's medical experts, which seems to us to accord with the probabilities which would be indicated by common experience. Respondent's sole medical witness testified that "in order * * * for there to be causal relationship between employment and the death there must be some outstanding stress or strain incident and I failed to find it in the hypothetical question." It is not clear whether the witness was thereby offering an opinion of law or of medicine. Without detailing it, we are clear that it amply supported the findings of fact.

Nor are we impressed with the contention that there is no convincing medical testimony to support the conclusion of causal relation between the stress, superinduced upon the pre-existing heart disease, and the fatal attack.

The record in the case before us is a good example of the kind of hypothetical "question" commonly encountered, where there is an apparent assumption by both examining counsel and expert witness that the propounding of the question is a mere procedural formality to be gotten on the record before the expert may proceed to state his opinion, generally arrived at before he comes to court and on the basis of information previously supplied him. "Recent Judicial Treatment of the Workmen's Compensation Act," 79 N.J.L.J. The artificiality of the current general approach to the use of hypothetical questions in our workmen's compensation practice was recently the subject of pertinent critical comment by Judge Francis. It has been recommended by the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence that the proposal in the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Proposed Rule 58) for dispensing with the mandatory hypothetical question be concurred in because of the gross abuse of the technique.

It is to be acknowledged at the outset that it is still the law in this State that the opinion of an expert witness not founded upon facts within his own knowledge and imparted to the fact-finder must be based upon a hypothetical question embracing material facts supported by evidence in the case.